# Will Artificial Emotional Agents Show Altruistic Punishment In The Public Goods Game?




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
the link to emotion?

behavior ... the scenario

for the emotional agent



## [ the public goods game ]



- 4 participants
- each participant gets 20 Euros
- choice to invest into a public project (0-20 Euros)
- the project is bearing 60 % interest
- the invested amount plus interest is equally split






## [ the public goods game ]

# The PGG scenario ... simplified

How do we get both players in a situation in which both are better off?



A rational agent would not invest anything in a public project!

Poor society!



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## [ the public goods game ]

# The PGG scenario ... with punishment

Less than before?
So would you punish the
"free rider"?

- invest 0-10 Euros to punish
- punished player must pay 3 times\* the invested sum

	Player A	Player B	Player C	Player D
investment	0	20	20	20
outcome	44	24	24	24
punishment	-90	0	0	0
punishment cost	0	-10	-10	-10
outcome	-46	14	14	14

<sup>\*</sup> scalable in other experiments



## [ altruistic punishment ]

# The iterated PGG scenario ... with punishment

- iteration of the situation makes punishment rational
- why? The free rider learns that the strategy is wrong

Fehr and Gächter setup:

- exchanging the group participants after each iteration



If the free rider learns from punishment, the punisher does not get a return!


but ... others will benefit from the change of behavior!



# **Altruism**



## [ mapping on occ ]






## [ mapping on occ ]






## [ mapping on occ ]






## [ mapping on occ ]





## [ mapping on occ ]






# [ mapping on occ ]

# **Emotion intensities**

Goals:

- a) get as much money as possible
- b) get more money than the others
- c) ...

Event: 32 Euros as result!








# [ mapping on occ ]

# Emotion intensities

Now: assume the player invested nothing ...


Event: 32 Euros as result!






# [ mapping on occ ]

# Emotion intensities





## [ personality and mood ]





## [ personality and mood ]

# Personality

Eysenck introvertivs, extrovert / stable vs. non-stable

here: openness: rigidly sticking with a moral standard or strategy vs. exeptions

energy: fast vs. slow mood changes, tendency to emotion based reactions

parameters for eliciting functions


function selection depends on goal as well

Hardcoded in this "toy example"



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## [ architecture ]





## [ decision making ]

# Decision making

- integrating emotion in a ruleset as facts (observations)
- alternative: adding a goal of well being

## investment

```
<last_invest = x> AND <pride> AND <joy> THEN <action = x>
<last_invest = x> AND <shame> AND <distress> THEN <action = x++>
<last_invest = x> AND <pride> AND <distress> THEN <action = x- ->
<last_invest = x> AND <shame> AND <joy> AND kes y> THEN <action = x++>
```

## punishment

<pride> AND <distress> AND <reproach y> THEN <punish y 1>



# [ conclusion ]

# Conclusion

# Now, will Artificial Emotional Agents Show Altruistic Punishment In The Public Goods Game, or not?

- well, they can be told to do so ...
- better question: will they still do so, once they mimic rational and emotional behavior?
- which form of agent personality will survive the pgg society?
- model understanding: which parts of OCC are hard to apply to the situation?

Next steps:

- integrate more features in the model
- complete the implementation
- add facial expression module
- experiments with human pgg groups
- experiments with agent populations

